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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 92-603
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
UNITED STATES, PETITIONERS v. BEACH
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for district of columbia circuit
[June 1, 1993]

  Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In providing for the regulation of cable television
facilities, Congress has drawn a distinction between facil-
ities that serve separately owned and managed buildings
and those that serve one or more buildings under common
ownership or management.  Cable facilities in the latter
category are exempt from regulation as long as they pro-
vide services without using public rights-of-way.  The
question before us is whether there is any conceivable
rational basis justifying this distinction for purposes of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

                            I
  The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable
Act), 98 Stat. 2779, amended the Communications Act of
1934, 47 U. S. C. 151 et seq., to establish a national
framework for regulating cable television.  One objective
of the Cable Act was to set out -franchise procedures and
standards which encourage the growth and development
of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are
responsive to the needs and interests of the local com-
munity.-  601(2), 47 U. S. C. 521(2).  To that end, Con-
gress provided for the franchising of cable systems by local
governmental authorities, 621(a), 47 U. S. C. 541(a),
and prohibited any person from operating a cable system
without a franchise, subject to certain exceptions, 621(b),
47 U. S. C. 541(b).  Section 602(7) of the Communica-
tions Act, as amended, 47 U. S. C. A. 522(7) (Supp.
1993), determines the reach of the franchise requirement
by defining the operative term -cable system.-  A cable
system means any facility designed to provide video
programming to multiple subscribers through -closed
transmission paths,- but does not include, inter alia,
-a facility that serves only subscribers in 1 or more
multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, con-
trol, or management, unless such facility or facilities
us[e] any public right-of-way.-  602(7)(B), 47
U. S. C. A. 522(7)(B) (Supp. 1993).
  In part, this provision tracks a regulatory -private cable-
exemption previously promulgated by the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC or Commission) pursuant to
pre-existing authority under the Communications Act.  See
47 CFR 76.5(a) (1984) (exempting from the definition of
-cable television system- -any such facility that serves or
will serve only subscribers in one or more multiple unit
dwellings under common ownership, control, or manage-
ment-).  The earlier regulatory exemption derived in turn
from the Commission's first set of cable rules, published
in 1965.  See Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38
F. C. C. 683, 741 (1965) (exempting from the definition
of -community antenna television system- -any such facil-
ity which serves only the residents of one or more apart-
ment dwellings under common ownership, control, or man-
agement, and commercial establishments located on the
premises of such an apartment house-).  The Cable Act
narrowed the terms of the regulatory exemption by further
excluding from the exemption any closed transmission
facilities that use public rights-of-way.
  This case arises out of an FCC proceeding clarifying the
agency's interpretation of the term -cable system- as it is
used in the Cable Act.  See In re Definition of a Cable
Television System, 5 F. C. C. Rcd. 7638 (1990).  In this
proceeding, the Commission addressed the application of
the exemption codified in 602(7)(B) to satellite master
antenna television (SMATV) facilities.  Unlike a tradi-
tional cable television system, which delivers video pro-
gramming to a large community of subscribers through
coaxial cables laid under city streets or along utility lines,
an SMATV system typically receives a signal from a satel-
lite through a small satellite dish located on a rooftop and
then retransmits the signal by wire to units within a
building or complex of buildings.  See 5 F. C. C. Rcd., at
7639.  The Commission ruled that an SMATV system that
serves multiple buildings via a network of interconnected
physical transmission lines is a cable system, unless it
falls within the 602(7)(B) exemption.  See id., at
7639-7640.  Consistent with the plain terms of the statu-
tory exemption, the Commission concluded that such an
SMATV system is subject to the franchise requirement if
its transmission lines interconnect separately owned and
managed buildings or if its lines use or cross any public
right-of-way.  See id., at 7641-7642.
  Respondents Beach Communications, Inc., Maxtel
Limited Partnership, Pacific Cablevision, and Western
Cable Communications, Inc.-SMATV operators that would
be subject to franchising under the Cable Act as construed
by the Commission-petitioned the Court of Appeals for
review.  The Court of Appeals rejected respondents' statu-
tory challenge to the Commission's interpretation, but a
majority of the court found merit in the claim that
602(7) violates the implied equal protection guarantee of
the Due Process Clause.  294 U. S. App. D. C. 377, 959
F. 2d 975 (1992).  In the absence of what it termed -the
predominant rationale for local franchising- (use of public
rights-of-way), the court saw no rational basis -[o]n the
record,- and was -unable to imagine- any conceivable
basis, for distinguishing between those facilities exempted
by the statute and those SMATV cable systems that link
separately owned and managed buildings.  Id., at 389, 959
F. 2d, at 987.  The court remanded the record and di-
rected the FCC to provide -additional `legislative facts'-
to justify the distinction.  Ibid.
  A report subsequently filed by the Commission failed to
satisfy the Court of Appeals.  The Commission stated that
it was -unaware of any desirable policy or other consider-
ations . . . that would support the challenged distinctions,-
other than those offered by a concurring member of the
court.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a.  The concurrence had
believed it sufficient that Congress could have reasoned
that SMATV systems serving separately owned buildings
are more similar to traditional cable systems than are
facilities serving commonly owned buildings, in terms of
the problems presented for consumers and the potential
for regulatory benefits.  See 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 392,
959 F. 2d, at 990 (Mikva, C. J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).  In a second opinion, the major-
ity found this rationale to be -a naked intuition, unsup-
ported by conceivable facts or policies,- ___ U. S. App.
D. C. ___, ___, 965 F. 2d 1103, 1105 (1992), and held that
-the Cable Act violates the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment, insofar as it imposes a discrimina-
tory franchising requirement,- id., at ___, 965 F. 2d, at
1104.  The court declared the franchise requirement void
to the extent it covers respondents and similarly situated
SMATV operators.  Id., at ___, 965 F. 2d, at 1106.
  Because the Court of Appeals held an Act of Congress
unconstitutional, we granted certiorari.  506 U. S. ___
(1992).  We now reverse.
                           II
  Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or in-
ferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for
courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative
choices.  In areas of social and economic policy, a statu-
tory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines
nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be
upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.  See Sullivan v.
Stroop, 496 U. S. 478, 485 (1990); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483
U. S. 587, 600-603 (1987); United States Railroad Retire-
ment Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174-179 (1980); Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 484-485 (1970).  Where
there are -plausible reasons- for Congress' action, -our
inquiry is at an end.-  United States Railroad Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, supra, at 179.  This standard of review is a
paradigm of judicial restraint.  -The Constitution pre-
sumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even
improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the
democratic process and that judicial intervention is gen-
erally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think
a political branch has acted.-  Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S.
93, 97 (1979) (footnote omitted).
  On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute
such as the Cable Act comes to us bearing a strong pre-
sumption of validity, see Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485
U. S. 360, 370 (1988), and those attacking the rationality
of the legislative classification have the burden -to nega-
tive every conceivable basis which might support it,- Lehn-
hausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 364
(1973) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See also Hodel
v. Indiana, 452 U. S. 314, 331-332 (1981).  Moreover,
because we never require a legislature to articulate its
reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for
constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for
the challenged distinction actually motivated the legis-
lature.  United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
supra, at 179.  See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603,
612 (1960).  Thus, the absence of -`legislative facts'-
explaining the distinction -[o]n the record,- 294 U. S. App.
D. C., at 389, 959 F. 2d, at 987, has no significance in
rational-basis analysis.  See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U. S.
___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 13) (equal protection -does not
demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legis-
lature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at
any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classifica-
tion-).  In other words, a legislative choice is not subject
to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.
See Vance v. Bradley, supra, at 111.  See also Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 464 (1981).
-`Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of
judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to
the legislative branch its rightful independence and its
ability to function.'-  Lehnhausen, supra, at 365 (quoting
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495,
510 (1937)).
  These restraints on judicial review have added force
-where the legislature must necessarily engage in a proc-
ess of line-drawing.-  United States Railroad Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S., at 179.  Defining the class of
persons subject to a regulatory requirement-much like
classifying governmental beneficiaries--inevitably requires
that some persons who have an almost equally strong
claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of
the line, and the fact [that] the line might have been
drawn differently at some points is a matter for legisla-
tive, rather than judicial, consideration.-  Ibid. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).  The distinction at
issue here represents such a line: By excluding from the
definition of -cable system- those facilities that serve
commonly owned or managed buildings without using pub-
lic rights-of-way, 602(7)(B) delineates the bounds of the
regulatory field.  Such scope-of-coverage provisions are un-
avoidable components of most economic or social legisla-
tion.  In establishing the franchise requirement, Congress
had to draw the line somewhere; it had to choose which
facilities to franchise.  This necessity renders the precise
coordinates of the resulting legislative judgment virtually
unreviewable, since the legislature must be allowed leeway
to approach a perceived problem incrementally.  See, e. g.,
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483
(1955):
-The problem of legislative classification is a perennial
one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition.  Evils in
the same field may be of different dimensions and
proportions, requiring different remedies.  Or so the
legislature may think.  Or the reform may take one
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative
mind.  The legislature may select one phase of one
field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.
The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes
no further than the invidious discrimination.-  Id., at
489 (citations omitted).
  Applying these principles, we conclude that the common-
ownership distinction is constitutional.  There are at least
two possible bases for the distinction; either one suffices.
First, Congress borrowed 602(7)(B) from pre-Cable Act
regulations, and although the existence of a prior adminis-
trative scheme is certainly not necessary to the rationality
of the statute, it is plausible that Congress also adopted
the FCC's earlier rationale.  Under that rationale, common
ownership was thought to be indicative of those systems
for which the costs of regulation would outweigh the bene-
fits to consumers.  Because the number of subscribers was
a similar indicator, the Commission also exempted cable
facilities that served fewer than 50 subscribers.  See 47
CFR 76.5(a) (1984).  In explaining both exemptions, the
Commission stated:
-[N]ot all [systems] can be subject to effective regula-
tion with the resources available nor is regulation
necessarily needed in every instance.  A sensible regu-
latory program requires that a division between the
regulated and unregulated be made in a manner
which best conserves regulatory energies and allows
the most cost effective use of available resources.  In
attempting to make this division, we have focused on
subscriber numbers as well as the multiple unit
dwelling indicia on the theory that the very small are
inefficient to regulate and can safely be ignored in
terms of their potential for impact on broadcast ser-
vice to the public and on multiple unit dwelling facili-
ties on the theory that this effectively establishes cer-
tain maximum size limitations.-  In re Definition of
a Cable Television System, 67 F. C. C. 2d 716, 726
(1978).
  This regulatory-efficiency model, originally suggested by
Chief Judge Mikva in his concurring opinion, provides a
conceivable basis for the common-ownership exemption.
A legislator might rationally assume that systems serving
only commonly owned or managed buildings without cross-
ing public rights-of-way would typically be limited in size
or would share some other attribute affecting their impact
on the welfare of cable viewers such that regulators could
-safely ignor[e]- these systems.
  Respondents argue that Congress did not intend com-
mon ownership to be a surrogate for small size, since Con-
gress simultaneously rejected the FCC's 50-subscriber
exemption by omitting it from the Cable Act.  Brief for
Respondents 22.  Whether the posited reason for the chal-
lenged distinction actually motivated Congress is -constitu-
tionally irrelevant,- United States Railroad Retirement Bd.
v. Fritz, supra, at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted),
and, in any event, the FCC's explanation indicates that
both common ownership and number of subscribers were
considered indicia of -very small- cable systems.  Respond-
ents also contend that an SMATV operator could increase
his subscription base and still qualify for the exemption
simply by installing a separate satellite dish on each
building served.  Brief for Respondents 42.  The additional
cost of multiple dishes and associated transmission equip-
ment, however, would impose an independent constraint
on system size.
  Furthermore, small size is only one plausible ownership-
related factor contributing to consumer welfare.  Sub-
scriber influence is another.  Where an SMATV system
serves a complex of buildings under common ownership
or management, individual subscribers could conceivably
have greater bargaining power vis---vis the cable operator
(even if the number of dwelling units were large), since
all the subscribers could negotiate with one voice through
the common owner or manager.  Such an owner might
have substantial leverage, because he could withhold per-
mission to operate the SMATV system on his property.
He would also have an incentive to guard the interests of
his tenants.  Thus, there could be less need to establish
regulatory safeguards for subscribers in commonly owned
complexes.  Respondents acknowledge such possibilities,
see id., at 44, and we certainly cannot say that these
assumptions would be irrational.
  There is a second conceivable basis for the statutory dis-
tinction.  Suppose competing SMATV operators wish to
sell video programming to subscribers in a group of con-
tiguous buildings, such as a single city block, which can
be interconnected by wire without crossing a public right-
of-way.  If all the buildings belong to one owner or are
commonly managed, that owner or manager could freely
negotiate a deal for all subscribers on a competitive basis.
But if the buildings are separately owned and managed,
the first SMATV operator who gains a foothold by signing
a contract and installing a satellite dish and associated
transmission equipment on one of the buildings would
enjoy a powerful cost advantage in competing for the
remaining subscribers: he could connect additional build-
ings for the cost of a few feet of cable, whereas any
competitor would have to recover the cost of his own
satellite headend facility.  Thus, the first operator could
charge rates well above his cost and still undercut the
competition.  This potential for effective monopoly power
might theoretically justify regulating the latter class of
SMATV systems and not the former.

                           III
  The Court of Appeals quite evidently believed that the
crossing or use of a public right-of-way is the only conceiv-
able basis upon which Congress could rationally require
local franchising of SMATV systems.  See ___ U. S. App.
D. C., at ___, 965 F. 2d, at 1105; 294 U. S. App. D. C.,
at 389, 959 F. 2d, at 987.  As we have indicated, however,
there are plausible rationales unrelated to the use of pub-
lic rights-of-way for regulating cable facilities serving
separately owned and managed buildings.  The assump-
tions underlying these rationales may be erroneous, but
the very fact that they are -arguable- is sufficient, on
rational-basis review, to -immuniz[e]- the congressional
choice from constitutional challenge.  Vance v. Bradley,
440 U. S., at 112.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
                                            So ordered.